Yet the widespread slaughter of people in the name of total war was a principle varying point between Asian and Western powers during the 19th century. Despite whatever moral and philosophical objections Clausewitz might have raised to total war, he certainly saw value in involving as much of a population as possible in its martial efforts. In this respect, he conceived of war from a decidedly nationalistic viewpoint, in which women and children may not have directly been involved in battles but were certainly useful in employing the spirit of nationalism that could motivate an entire populace to focus its efforts on successfully waging war. Tactically, however, some of Clausewitz conceptions stemmed from those of Asian antiquity, particularly from Sun Tzu's longstanding treatise the Art of War. Although this book was written well before the 19th century, it was certainly influential in its early conception of war in which the art it was based upon was short for artifice. The author devotes more than 100 pages to essentially deploying strategy that will decive an opponent. Some of Clausewitz's more contemporary notions of strategy, however, incorporated this aspect of dissembling to gain a tactical advantage.

Other of Clausewitz's tactics, however, were greater at variance than those of Sun Tzu and virtually anything that his Asian counterparts in the 19th century could have adopted prior to Westernization. In particular, the author stressed the value of a defensive position as being inherently greater than that of an aggressor. He primarily did so from an asymmetrical point-of-view in which it was more difficult to successfully penetrate a well-defended territory. The collapse of much of Asia -- and China in particular, to the Westernized forces of imperialism demonstrate...

Despite the fact that China contested the war from its own homeland, and vastly outnumbered their European counterparts and had access to plentiful resources, the British widely routed them in just three years' time. This occurred in spite of the fact that the British had to transport every man and musket overseas, and were the attacking party fighting on a foreign soil. The British were largely able to win this martial encounter due to their superior naval prowess, which succeeded in blockading ports and working its way inland from water routes. Had the Chinese been able to defend themselves better, they would have been able to prevent this aggressive act of imperialism. But they were still immature in Western standards of warfare until they became fully Westernized at the turn of the century.
Despite the points of commonalities that are found between the continents of Europe and Asia during the majority of the 19th century, it is clear that the formations and techniques of the Europeans were vastly superior to that of Asians. What is highly interesting about this fact is that it is not merely limited to feats on the battlefield. Clausewitz's acknowledgement of, and lack of preference towards the proclivities of total warfare attest to a moral and philosophical superiority that many Asian war theorists could not claim to match during this century. Although Clausewitz and other strategists learned from Asia during earlier centuries, Asia, was largely behind Europe in martial encounters for the duration of the 19th century.

Works Cited

Clausewitz, Carl von (1984). On War [Vom Krieg] (Indexed ed.). New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001

Hitler, Adolph. "No title." www.teachgenocide.org. 1939. Retrieved from http://www.teachgenocide.org/files/Hitler%20-%20The%20Armenian%20Genocide.pdf

Needham, Joseph (1986), Science & Civilisation in China, V:7: The Gunpowder Epic, Cambridge University Press